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Abstract: In the European railways standards 
(CENELEC EN 50126 [4], EN 50128 [5], EN 50129
[6]), it is required to obtain evidence of safety in 
system requirements specifications. The focus of this 
paper is on the development of system requirements 
specifications with respect to fulfilling demands of 
European railways standards. In spite of progress 
carried out in software development, designing a 
complex system while respecting its safety 
requirements, remains very hard. Ambiguities and 
defects in system requirements specification may 
have consequences on the whole system 
development.
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1. Introduction
In the railway domain, safety requirements are 
obviously severe. It is very important to keep 
requirements traceability during software 
development process even if the different used 
models are informal, semi formal or formal. We 
investigate how the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML), can be used to formally specify and verify 
critical railways systems. A benefit of using UML is it 
status as an international standard (OMG) and its 
widespread use in the software industries. 
Safety invariants can be derived from hazard 
analysis and can be supported by a system model in 
diagrams of UML.
In this paper, we purpose a method for modelling a 
safety railways application. But the precondition to 
use UML diagrams for system specification, which is 
usable for formal correctness proofs and refutation 
checks, is that the UML has to be used with a 
precise semantics. This is possible by definitions of 
translation rules for the conversion of UML notation 
in a formal language. This study is integrated into a 
larger one (called B-RAIL) that aims at linking an 
informal approach (UML notation) to a formal (B 
method) one. 
2. UML
Born from the different object methods, like OMT or 
Booch & Jacobson, and normalised by the Object 
Management Group1, Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) has now become a standard to model 
systems. The UML notation [11] makes it possible to 
model an application according to an object view. 
Many different diagram types make this model. Each 
diagram allows a particular view of the system. 
The 9 more important diagrams are:
 Use Case diagram,
 Component Diagram,
 Collaboration Diagram,
 Class Diagram,
 Deployment Diagram,
 State Diagram,
 Activity Diagram,
 Sequence Diagram,
 Object Diagram.
The reader interested by more details in syntactic 
and semantic aspects can refer to the reference 
guide of UML [10]. Even if UML notation is a 
language in which models can be represented, it 
doesn’t define the making process of these models. 
Nevertheless, several dedicated tools have 
strengthened the popularity of UML. These tools 
allow graphic notation and partial generation of the 
associated code and documentations. The UML
notation is known by most computer scientists and is 
now used in several domains. Using UML class 
diagrams to define information structures has now 
become standard practice in industry. Recently, the 
critical application domains have used the notation 
and several questions exist around this use.
In the next part of the paper, among the different 
possible diagrams, we’ll use the state diagrams 
particularly adapted to reactive system modelling. A 
state is a condition in an object life while it satisfies 
some conditions, runs some actions or waits for 
some events. There are two specials states: initial 
state and end state. The Initial State is the state of 
an object before any transition. End States mark the 
destruction of the object whose state we are 
modelling. An event is a particular occurrence that 
can trigger a transition from a state to an other one. 
A state diagram can represent the system behaviour. 
1 http://www.omg.org
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This type of diagram represents finite state 
automaton, under a graphical representation, linked 
by oriented arcs describing transitions. 
Statechart diagrams ([12], [13]), also referred to as 
State diagrams, are used to document the various 
modes ("state") that a class can go through, and the 
events that cause a state transition. The state-
transitions graph formalism is not a UML innovation. 
It has often been employed in other contexts and a 
large consensus, from David Harel’s works, exists 
around this notation. It introduces the description of 
possible sequences of states or actions which can 
occur to an element during its life. Such sequences 
arise from element reaction to discrete events.
3. Case Study
To illustrate our approach, we will choose to design 
a level crossing. This example is inspired by Jansen, 
L. and Schneider, E. [9]. The term level crossing, in 
general a crossing at the same level, i.e. without 
bridge or tunnel, is especially used in the case where 
a road crosses a railway; it also applies when a light 
rail line with separate right-of-way crosses a road; 
the term "metro" usually means by definition that 
there are no level crossings. 
Firstly, a single-track line, which crosses a road in 
the same level, is modelled (figure 1).
The crossing zone is named danger zone. The most 
important security rule is to avoid collision by 
prohibiting road and railway traffic simultaneously on 
level crossing. The railway crossing is equipped with 
barriers and road traffic lights to forbid the car
passage. 
Figure. 1- Single-track line level crossing
Two sensors appear on the railroad to detect the 
beginning (train entrance) and the end (train exit) of 
the level crossing protection procedure. The level 
crossing is not in an urban zone; this implies a sound 
signalization.
Traffic lights consist of two lights: one red and one 
yellow. When they are switched off, road users 
(drivers, cyclists, pedestrians,) can cross. 
When the yellow light is shown road shall stop at the 
level crossing if possible. In the other case, the level 
crossing is closed and railway traffic has priority. The 
yellow and red light never must be shown together.
3. Requirement
3.1 Environment
It is often difficult to understand requirements if they 
are stated as a list. For that reason, functional 
requirements (and even some non-functional 
requirements) can be expressed by using some ”use 
cases”.
A use case analysis involves the following steps: 
o Determine the actors, i.e. any outside 
entities (people, systems, etc.) that interact 
with the system.
o Identification of Use Cases (name, purpose, 
goal, pre- and post-condition, ..).
Figure. 2 – Contextual diagram
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A use case diagram describes and traces the 
functional requirements of the system and describe 
how the system can and will be used. The use case 
diagram gives an overview of the model.
UR3: The railway crossing is equipped with barriers and 
road traffic lights. Traffic lights at the level crossing 
consist of a red and a yellow light.
3.2 Failures
The user requirement gives information concerning 
the failures and their direct effects on the system.
UR12: Possible failure conditions have to be taken into 
account for a safe control of the level crossing and the 
train.
In our model, failures of yellow or red traffic lights (to 
be separately), barriers, the vehicle sensor and the 
delay or loss of radio network are considered.
Use case of figure 3 is an example where we model 
some communication failures.
Figure. 3 – Use case
Operational scenarios can be specified by means of 
sequence diagrams of UML (see Figure 4).
3.3 Risk analysis
According to EN 50129 [6], risk analysis essentially 
consists of four steps:
o system definition;
o identification of operational hazards;
o consequence analysis;
o risks assessments.
Figure. 4 – Sequence diagram
The identification of operational hazards (step 2) can 
be done by the analysis of the user requirements 
(UR) and/or by the analysis of classical risks. In our 
case, the UR contains:
UR2: The intersection area of the road and the railway 
line is called danger zone, since trains and road traffic 
must not enter it at the same time to avoid collision.
Road TrafficTrain
Access to the danger zone
one access
<<include>>
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Figure. 5 - Use case from UR2
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Figure 5 a use case that described the basic risk.
In first time, we derive safety requirement by using 
FTA (Fault Tree Analysis). A FTA is a graphical 
technique that provides a systematic description of 
the combinations of possible occurrences in a 
system, which can result in an undesirable outcome 
(for more information see International standard IEC 
61025 [8]). This method can combine hardware 
failures and human failures. For safety-critical 
systems, the root node of the tree will often 
represent a system-wide, catastrophic event taken 
from a pre-existing hazards list.
From the collision risk we can derive the next FTA:
Figure. 6 - Fault Tree Analysis
The first FTA is split in some part. The D part 
concerns some human errors. The C part introduces 
the principle property for the system: “The system 
does not granted access in same time to train and 
road traffic”.
Figure. 7 - Fault Tree Analysis continue
The A and B part deals with absence and failures of 
equipments (barrier, traffic light, communication, 
train sensor). 
3.4. System Modelling
For modelling the system structure and interfaces 
between system objects class diagrams are suitable 
(Figure 8). The class diagram describes the 
relationships between classes and shows the logical 
view of a system (static view).
In respect with safety analysis, the control system 
provides the capability to authorise the danger zone 
access for road traffic or for train. 
This system immediately reports the occurrence and 
repair of failures to the Operation Centre.
Figure. 8- First Class diagram
3.5 Sub-System Modelling
UR 3: Decentralized radio-based control system
This UR indicates that the system is split in 3 parts:
o Communication sub system,
o Train control system (TCS),
o Level crossing system (LCS).
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In figure 9, we split the current system in three sub-
systems and we introduced some interaction 
between environment (barriers, ColorLight, physical 
train and road traffic) with the level crossing 
application.
Figure. 9- Sub-system decomposition
The figure 10 purposes a complete class diagram 
which introduced some interactions between all 
components (actors, physicals components and 
applications softwares):
o Level crossing control system and physical 
equipment (barrier, traffic light, train 
sensors)
o Train control system and physical equipment 
(train sensor),
o Level crossing control system and
communication,
o Train control system and communication,
o Operation centre and communication
Statechart diagrams (states/transitions diagram), 
also referred to as State diagrams, are used to 
document the various modes ("state") that a class 
can go through, and the events that cause a state 
transition. The state-transitions graph formalism is 
not a UML innovation. It has often been employed in 
other contexts and a large consensus, from David 
Harel’s works, exists around this notation. 
Figure. 10 - Complete class diagram
It introduces the description of possible sequences 
of states or actions which can occur to an element 
during its life. Such sequences arise from element 
reaction to discrete events.
Figure. 11 - Statechart for train behaviour
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Figure 11, introduce the behaviour of embedded 
system. When the train passed the start of danger 
zone, the embedded system asks to the control 
system an acknowledgement (ack), the embedded 
system gets into stand by and begin to brake in 
order to pull down the barrier in time. After this notice 
time, the control system sends its state to embedded 
one. If the level crossing is in safe mode, the 
embedded system stops the braking and restarts 
with its initial speed. An end-crossing sensor detects 
the train exit and starts the barrier pull up and the 
lights switch off.
We coded all properties in UML by using OCL 
constraints attached to classes or sets of 
associations to specify safety and operational 
invariants of reactive systems in a concise manner.
4. Conclusion
The main difficulty to specify railway case study is 
the less of harmonisation between the different 
European systems. 
The level crossing modelling presented here gives a 
first step to a computerised management of level 
crossing.
In this paper, we purpose a method for modelling a 
safety railways application. But the precondition to 
use UML diagrams for system specification, which is 
usable for formal correctness proofs and refutation 
checks, is that the UML has to be used with a 
precise semantics. This is possible by definitions of 
translation rules for the conversion of UML notation 
in a formal language.
Our global project purposes to transform a semi 
formal modelling (UML model) to a formal 
specification (B method, for more information see 
[1]).
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